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NOTES
John C. Grimberg Co. v. United States: Has the
Federal Circuit Eased the Restrictions of the
Buy American Act?
I. Introduction
Traditionally, U.S. industry and its workers have felt threatened
by foreign competition. Some protection from this threat exists in
the form of the Buy American Act.' Although originally passed by
Congress during the Great Depression,2 the Act remains significant
today. The Act provides that only articles, materials, and supplies
produced or manufactured in the United States shall be acquired for
public use inside the United States.3 The same restrictions apply to
contractors, subcontractors, and suppliers4 of every public works
construction contract funded by federal appropriations. 5
1 41 U.S.C.A. §§ loa-d (West Supp. 1989).
2 Buy American Act, ch. 212, tit. 111, 47 Stat. 1489 (1933) (codified as amended at 41
U.S.C.A. §§ lOa-d (West Supp. 1989)).
3 Section 2 of the Act provides in pertinent part:
Notwithstanding. any other provision of law, and unless the head of the
Federal agency concerned shall determine it to be inconsistent with the pub-
lic interest, or the cost to be unreasonable, only such unmanufactured arti-
cles, materials, and supplies as have been mined or produced in the United
States, and only such manufactured articles, materials, and supplies as have
been manufactured in the United States substantially all from articles, mater-
ials, or supplies mined, produced, or manufactured, as the case may be, in
the United States, shall be acquired for public use.
41 U.S.C.A. § 10a (West Supp. 1989). The 1988 amendments substituted "Federal
agency" for "department or independent establishment." Buy American Act of 1988,
Pub. L. No. 100-418, tit. VII, § 7005(b), 102 Stat. 1553.
4 41 U.S.C.A § 10b(a) (West Supp. 1989); see infra note 5. The standard Buy Ameri-
can Act clause states in part: "The Contractor agrees that only domestic construction
material will be used by the Contractor, subcontractors, material men, and suppliers in the
performance of this contract, except for foreign construction materials, if any, listed in this
contract." 48 C.F.R. § 52.225-5 (1988).
5 Section 3 of the Act provides in pertinent part:
(a) Every contract for the construction, alteration, or repair of any public
building or public work in the United States growing out of an appropriation
heretofore made or hereafter to be made shall contain a provision that in the
performance of the work the contractor, subcontractors, material men, or
suppliers, shall use only such unmanufactured articles, materials, and sup-
plies as have been mined or produced in the United States, and only such
manufactured articles, materials, and supplies as have been manufactured in
the United States substantially all from articles, materials, or supplies mined,
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While it may appear restrictive on its face, the Act provides flexi-
bility for the procuring agency. It applies only to those items that are
manufactured in the United States in sufficient and reasonably avail-
able quantities of satisfactory quality, and only to raw materials simi-
larly available.6 The head of the procuring agency may purchase
foreign goods or goods made from raw materials originating abroad
if the agency head determines that the acquisition of domestic goods
would be inconsistent with the public interest, or finds the price of
domestic goods to be unreasonable. 7 Likewise, the agency head may
make exceptions for particular items in construction contracts.8
The Act itself sets no criteria for determining the reasonable-
ness of prices of domestic products. Executive Order No. 10,582 im-
plements the Act, and directs that a differential be added to the price
of the foreign materials for comparison with prices of domestic
materials. 9 Federal Acquisition Regulations direct application of a
straightforward six percent differential, in specified cases.' 0 For ex-
produced, or manufactured, as the case may be, in the United States except
as provided in section 10a of this title ....
41 U.S.C.A. § 10b(a) (West Supp. 1989). Federal acquisition regulations require the in-
sertion of a Buy American clause into solicitations and contracts for construction inside
the United States. 48 C.F.R. § 25.205 (1988).
6 Section 2 of the Act provides in pertinent part:
This section shall not apply with respect to articles, materials, or supplies for
use outside the United States, or if articles, materials, or supplies of the class
or kind to be used or the articles, materials, or supplies from which they are
manufactured are not mined, produced, or manufactured, as the case may
be, in the United States in sufficient and reasonably available commercial
quantities and of a satisfactory quality.
41 U.S.C.A. § 10a (West Supp. 1989); see also supra note 3. Section 3 of the Act, relating to
construction contracts, further provides:
[i]f the head of the federal agency making the contract shall find that in re-
spect to some particular articles, materials, or supplies it is impracticable to
make such requirement or that it would unreasonably increase the cost, an
exception shall be noted in the specifications as to that particular article, ma-
terial, or supply, and a public record made of the findings which justified the
exception.
41 U.S.C.A. § 10b(a) (West Supp. 1989); see also supra note 5.
7 41 U.S.C.A. § 10a; see supra note 3.
8 41 U.S.C.A. § 10b(a); see supra note 6.
9 The Order provides in pertinent part:
(b) For the purposes of the said act of March 3, 1933 . . . the bid or
offered price of materials of domestic origin shall be deemed to be unreason-
able, or the purchase of such materials shall be deemed to be inconsistent
with the public interest, if the bid or offered price thereof exceeds the sum of
the bid or offered price of like materials of foreign origin and a differential
computed as provided in subsection (c) of this section.
[(c)](l) The sum determined by computing six per centum of the bid or
offered price of materials of foreign origin [or]
(2) The sum determined by computing ten per centum of the bid or
offered price of materials of foreign origin exclusive of applicable duty and
all costs incurred after arrival in the United States ....
Exec. Order No. 10,582, § 2, 3 C.F.R. 230, 231 (1954-1958), reprinted in 41 U.S.C. § 10d
app. at 1042 (1982).
10 48 C.F.R. § 25.105(a) (1988). This section only applies to supplies contracts. 48
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ample, in a supply contract the price of a domestic product is unrea-
sonable if it exceeds the lowest foreign price by more than six
percent. The Executive Order and implementing regulations do not
apply when the head of the procuring agency determines that a
greater price differential is reasonable or "that the purchase of do-
mestic materials is not inconsistent with the public interest."' 1
The Buy American Act and its implementing regulations do not
address the question of what standards, if any, apply to requests for
exceptions submitted after contracts are awarded. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit recently addressed this
question. The court held in John C. Grimberg Co. v. United States 12 that
a contractor was entitled to an equitable adjustment of the contract
price after the contract was performed because the Navy refused to
grant a post-award exception to the requirements of the Buy Ameri-
can Act. This Note examines the reasoning behind that decision, its
place in the development of public contract law, and its possible ef-
fects on federal procurement practices.
II. Statement of the Case
In Grimberg the plaintiff contractor had been awarded a contract
by the Navy for construction work at the Naval Center in Bethesda,
Maryland.' 3 Prior to bidding, it had managed to secure only one
quotation from a domestic subcontractor for the fabrication and in-
stallation of precast concrete wall panels included in the contract.'
4
After it received the award, Grimberg was unable to consummate the
subcontract.' 5 It resolicited bids from domestic subcoptractors and
received two higher quotations covering only fabrication.16
Grimberg then subcontracted both the fabrication and installation to
C.F.R. § 25.100 (1988). The section that apples to construction contracts appears to give
the agency head discretion to determine that using a particular domestic product "would
unreasonably increase the cost or would be impracticable." 48 C.F.R. § 25.203(a) (1988).
The subpart regarding construction contracts, however, expressly incorporates Executive
Order No. 10,582. See 48 C.F.R. § 25.200 (1988). Therefore, the agency head presumably
would utilize either the six percent differential or the ten percent differential to determine
whether the restrictions of the Act apply to construction contracts. See supra note 9.
11 Exec. Order No. 10,582, § 5, 3 C.F.R. at 231, reprinted in 41 U.S.C. § 1Od app. at
1042.
12 869 F.2d 1475 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
13 Id. at 1476.
14 Id. Arban & Carosi, a domestic supplier, quoted a total price of $245,000-
$165,500 for fabrication and $79,500 for erection, caulking, and cleaning. Id.
15 Id. The majority simply stated that Grimberg unsuccessfully attempted to contact
Arban & Carosi shortly after the award. The dissent pointed out that Grimberg never
attempted to contact Arban & Carosi in writing. Judge Bennett thus maintained in dissent
that Grimberg's own neglect in failing to firm up the contract led the company to seek a
post-award exemption. Id. at 1480 (Bennett, J., dissenting).
16 Id. at 1476. The quotations were for $205,000 and $200.918. Both covered only
the fabrication of the precast panels. Id.
1990]
N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. [VoL. 15
a Canadian firm. 17
The Navy rejected the panel drawings Grimberg submitted be-
cause use of the Canadian fabricator violated the Buy American Act,
and refused Grimberg's subsequent request for a waiver of the re-
quirements of the Act. 18 Grimberg eventually obtained the panels
from a domestic subcontractor at a higher price than that quoted by
the Canadian firm.' 9 Pursuant to the contract's disputes clause,
Grimberg submitted a claim to the Navy for equitable adjustment. 20
The Navy denied the claim, and Grimberg appealed to the Armed
Services Board of Contract Appeals, 21 contending that the Navy was
obligated to grant an exception either because of unavailability or
unreasonable cost of domestic panels. 22
The Armed Services Board held against Grimberg, finding the
case to fall within the general rule that availability of materials is a
business risk assumed by the contractor.23 The Board found as a
matter of fact that the panels were available, but at a higher price.24
It rejected Grimberg's unreasonable cost argument based on its
reading of Executive Order No. 10,582 and the Federal Circuit's
opinion in John T. Brady & Co. v. United States,25 which allowed a post-
award waiver of the Act. 26 The Board found that section 5 of the
Order gives agencies the flexibility to utilize higher price differentials
than those prescribed even in the absence of regulations specifically
establishing greater differentials for construction contracts. 27 The
Board looked to Brady for guidance as to what circumstances would
warrant a post-award exception for unreasonable cost, 2 8 and found
17 Id. The subcontract carried a price of $120,000 for fabrication and $117,000 for
erection and miscellaneous work, for a total price of $237,000. Id.
18 Id.
19 Id. Grimberg's actual costs amounted to $282,000, including $200,000 for
fabrication, $59,000 for erection, and approximately $23,000 for miscellaneous work. Id.
20 Grimberg submitted an equitable adjustment claim for $53,847. Id. Government
contracts generally contain a changes clause that permits the contracting officer to make
unilateral changes, in designated areas, within the scope of the contract. 48 C.F.R.
§ 43.201 (1988); Checchi, Federal Procurement and Commercial Procurement Under the U.CC. -
A Comparison, 11 PUB. CONT. L.J. 358, 363-64 (1980). The disputes clause provides that the
contracting officer shall make an equitable adjustment in the price or schedule if the
change results in an increase or decrease in the cost or time of performance, whether or
not directly changed by the order. See, e.g., 48 C.F.R. § 52.243-4(d) (1988) (for construc-
tion contracts). Many changes clauses expressly give the contractor a right to present a
claim under the disputes clause when there is a failure to agree on the amount of the
adjustment. Checchi, supra, at 364; see, e.g., 48 C.F.R. § 52.243-1(e).
21 John C. Grimberg, Co., ASBCA No. 32288, 88-1 B.C.A. (CCH) 20,346, at
102,888 (1987), reconsideration denied, 88-2 B.C.A. (CCH) 20,713 (1988), rev'd sub nom.
John C. Grimberg, Co. v. United States, 869 F.2d 1475 (Fed. Cir. 1989).2 2 John C. Grimberg, 88-1 B.C.A. (CCH) at 102,894.
23 Id. at 102,895.
24 Id at 102,890 (finding no. 6), 102,894.
25 693 F.2d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1982).
2 6 John C. Gimberg, 88-1 B.C.A. (CCH) at 102,894 (citing Brady, 693 F.2d at 1387).
27 Id.
28 Id. "[1It may be impossible for the contractor in some instances to make a pre-
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such circumstances lacking in Grimberg's case.29
The Federal Circuit reversed, concluding that the Board erred
as a matter of law in interpreting both the Buy American Act and
Brady.30 According to the court, the Executive Order presents the
head of the procuring agency With the option to make a determina-
tion as to the appropriate price differential. When the head of the
agency chooses not to exercise his option, the prescribed six percent
differentials become mandatory.3'
More significantly, the court gave a broad construction to Brady.
While the Armed Services Board read Brady as recognizing post-
award exceptions only under a narrow range of circumstances,3 2 the
Federal Circuit found that Brady simply allowed additional factors to
be considered in reviewing denial of post-award waivers. 33 This
means that the granting of a post-award waiver or adjustment is dis-
cretionary.3 4 In Grimberg's case, the court held that the denial of a
post-award waiver was an abuse of discretion by the Navy, constitut-
ing a constructive change and entitling Grimberg to an equitable ad-
justment under the contract's changes clause.3 5 However, the court
did not identify those additional factors that may be considered in
the post-award decision, nor did it offer any guidance as to how to
assess those factors.
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Bennett called for a much nar-
rower reading of Brady, one in accord with established contract
law.3 6 He agreed with the Armed Services Board that Brady allows
post-award exceptions or equitable adjustment only under extraordi-
award request for exemption.... There will be other instances where domestic material is
unavailable or where its price escalates dramatically after the contract has been awarded."
Id. (quoting Brady, 693 F.2d at 1386). As an example of such a dramatic price escalation,
the Board referred to the Brady court's citation of a case in which the price increased from
$2.14 to $12.14 after the award. Id. at 102,894-95 (citing Brady, 693 F.2d at 1386 n.3).
29 Id. at 102,894.
30 Grimberg, 869 F.2d at 1477.
3' Id.
32 John C. Grimberg, Co., ASBCA No. 32288, 88-2 B.C.A. (CCH) 20,713, at
104,664 (1988), denying reconsideration to 88-1 B.C.A. (CCH) $ 20,346 (1987).
33 Grimberg, 869 F.2d at 1478.
34 Id. at 1478.n.2.
35 Id. at 1478. The Board of Contract Appeals developed the doctrine of constructive
change in order to resolve controversies arising from the performance of additional work
because of some informal government action or inaction. D. ARNAVAS & W. RUBEkRY,
GOVERNMENT CONTRACT GUIDEBOOK 10-14 (1986). The effect of a constructive change is
the same as the effect of a formal change order, id., and, just as with a change order, the
adjustment may be upward or downward. One major category of constructive changes
involves defective specifications, where a contractor may be entitled to relief after the Gov-
ernment has failed to issue a proper change order. Id. at 7-17. In Grimberg's situation, it
may be said that the specification of domestic materials was itself defective because of
Grimberg's right to use foreign materials meeting the test of Executive Order No. 10,582.
Once put on notice, the contracting officer had the duty to issue a change order allowing
that use. His inaction constituted a constructive change.
36 See Grimberg, 869 F.2d at 1479-80 (Bennett,J., dissenting) (harmonizing Brady with
the rules that the contractor bears the risk of acquiring the materials necessary to complete
1990]
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nary circumstances.3 7 He saw the Brady exceptions as arising either
from post-award unavailability of domestic materials or from action
on the part of the contracting agency causing the failure to seek the
exception before the award.38 In Brady, and the cases approved
therein, the contractors had no opportunity or reason to seek their
exceptions before the award. Post-award exceptions in those circum-
stances pose no conflict with the rule that a contractor bears the risk
of obtaining the materials necessary to his performance.3 9 Brady is
also in accord with the rule that the Government is responsible for
the additional cost caused by its own delay. 40 In Judge Bennett's
view, there was no inherent unfairness in Grimberg's situation that
called for an equitable remedy, because Grimberg lost the proposed
domestic supplier by its own neglect.4 1
Judge Bennett took issue with the majority on two further
points. Either point would have changed the outcome of the deci-
sion. First, he argued that a proper application of the price differen-
tial would have shown that there was no actual harshness in
requiring Grimberg to bear the additional costs of performing in
compliance with the Buy American Act. 4 2 He argued that the price
of foreign goods should have been compared to the quotation upon
which Grimberg based its bid, not to the quotations it solicited after
the award. 43
Second, he disagreed with the majority's finding that the pre-
scribed differential becomes mandatory in the absence of action by
the agency head. Judge Bennett contended that the contracting of-
ficer validly exercised the power delegated to him when he denied
Grimberg's claim for extra CoStS. 4 4 In Judge Bennett's eyes, the ma-
jority implicitly relied on the rule that discretionary authority con-
ferred by statute cannot be delegated absent express statutory
the contract, and that the Government is liable for any additional cost caused by its own
delay).
37 Id. at 1479 (Bennett, J., dissenting).
38 Id. (Bennett, J., dissenting). The dissent compared Grimberg with the following:
John T. Brady & Co. v. United States, 693 F.2d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1982) (contracting
agency's delay in providing specifications prevented pre-award request); M.S.I. Corp.,
VACAB No. 503, 65-2 B.C.A. (CCH) 5,203 (1965) (post-award unavailability of specified
material), and 40 Comp. Gen. 644 (1961) (contracting agency's placement of material on
exempt list prevented pre-award request).
39 869 F.2d at 1479-80 (Bennett, J., dissenting).
40 Id. at 1480 (Bennett, J., dissenting).
41 Id. (Bennett,J., dissenting).
42 'Id. (Bennett, J., dissenting).
43 Id. (Bennett, J., dissenting). For purposes of comparison, Judge Bennett added the
six percent differential to the foreign materials portion of the bid from Grimberg's pro-
posed Canadian subcontractor. Id. at 1480 n.2. The result was a total bid of $244,200. Id.
Grimberg had based its own bid on an expected domestic price of $e45,000, only 0.33%
higher than the foreign bid. Id. at 1480; see infra notes 133-34 and accompanying text for a
comparison with the majority's approach.
44 869 F.2d at 1483 (Bennett, J., dissenting).
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provision. 45  He maintained that the authority to change the differ-
ential comes not from the Buy American Act, but from the imple-
menting Executive Order.46 Thus, the rule that power authorized by
regulation may be delegated vests the contracting officer with the
discretion to apply a greater differential. 47 The Act itself forbids use
of any foreign product absent action by the agency head,48 but the
discretion to take that action was not in issue.49 The discretion in
issue was that afforded by the Executive Order to determine whether
domestic goods are unreasonably priced, not unlike other powers of
the agency heads that have been held delegable to the contracting
officer. 50
III. Previous Cases on Post-Award Exemptions
Although the Buy American Act has played a part in much litiga-
tion, there is little precedent in the courts regarding post-award
waivers. Brady, decided in 1982, was a case of first impression be-
cause all previous rulings had been administrative decisions. 51 As
the court in Brady noted, those administrative boards' conclusions of
law have no finality in the eyes of the courts. 52 The Comptroller
General, however, has developed much expertise regarding the in-
terpretation and application of the Buy American Act. 55  His opin-
ions have been accorded substantial weight by the courts in many
cases involving government procurements. 54
45 Id. at 1482 (Bennett, J., dissenting). The majority rejected the dissent's delegation
argument on the grounds that the contract itself explicitly prohibited delegation to the
contracting officer by its definition of "agency head." Id. at 1478 n.1. The dissent read
that definition as restricting only the meaning of "duly authorized representative" within
the contract provisions. Judge Bennett dismissed the former language as mere boiler-
plate, ineffective against a rule of law permitting delegation. Id. at 1482 n.5 (Bennett, J.,
dissenting).
46 Id. at 1482-83 (Bennett, J., dissenting).
47 Id. at 1483 (Bennett, J., dissenting).
48 See 41 U.S.C.A. § 10a (West Supp. 1989) "[U]nless the head of the Federal agency
concerned shall determine ... the cost to be unreasonable" materials of domestic origin
shall be acquired for public use. Id.
49 869 F.2d at 1482 (Bennett, J., dissenting).
50 Id. (Bennett, J., dissenting). Judge Bennett cited one example, an agency head's
power to cancel bid invitations after the opening of bids, 48 C.F.R. § 14.404-1(c), one of
the grounds for which is that all bids are unreasonably priced. 48 C.F.R. § 14.404-1(c)(6)
(1988). Although the regulation requires the agency head to make the determination in
writing, it has been held the contracting officer may do so. 869 F.2d at 1483 (Bennett, J,
dissenting).
51 John T. Brady & Co. v. United States, 693 F.2d 1380, 1384-85 (Fed. Cir. 1982).
52 Id. at 1385. The standard of review is set by statute. On appeal from a decision of
an agency board of contract appeals, "notwithstanding any contract provision, regulation,
or rules of law to the contrary, the decision of the agency board on any question of law
shall not be final or conclusive." Contract Disputes Act § 10, 41 U.S.C. § 609 (1982).
53 693 F.2d at 1385.
54 See, e.g., id. (noting expertise of Comptroller General regarding Buy American Act);
Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Friedkin, 481 F. Supp. 1256, 1268 (M.D. Pa.), aff'd, 635 F.2d 248
(3d Cir. 1980) (great weight entitled to interpretations of Buy American Act regulations by
agency charged with administering them); Wheelabrator Corp. v. Chafee, 455 F.2d 1306,
N.CJ. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
The Comptroller General has held consistently that the winning
bidder assumes the legal obligation to provide domestic products if
the bidder fails to declare otherwise in a Buy American Certificate
included with the bid.55 On the other hand, he also has held that
changes to the contract's list of exempt items may be made at any
time,5 6 including during performance of the contract. 57 To do this, a
change order should be issued and accompanied by an equitable ad-
justment in price if appropriate. 58
As to the mandatory nature of the six percent differential, the
Comptroller General has held on two occasions that it applies in the
absence of a contrary determination by the head of the procuring
agency. 59 The Executive Order vests "discretionary authority in the
agency head" to make such determinations. 60 Despite never ad-
dressing the question whether the contracting officer could exercise
such discretion, the opinions do not seem to contemplate such a
possibility.61
Prior to Brady, the administrative boards of contract appeals de-
nied relief to contractors who unsuccessfully sought post-award ex-
ceptions to the Buy American Act based on price. The Veterans
Administration Contracts Appeals Board addressed the question of
1314-16 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (reviewed role of General Accounting Office in bid protest ac-
tions; court may issue preliminary injunction pending determination by that agency). For
a discussion of the Comptroller General's authority and role, see Tieder & Tracy, Forums
and Remdies for Disappointed Bidders on Federal Government Contracts, 10 PuB. CONT. L.J. 92, 95-
106 (1978).
55 47 Comp. Gen. 624, 626 (1968) (no material difference between bidder's failure to
execute the certificate and agency's failure to include certificate in bid invitation) (citing
Comp. Gen. Dec. B-157815 (Jan. 21, 1966) (failure to execute certificate binds contrac-
tor)). Accord 50 Comp. Gen. 697, 702 (1971) (citing Comp. Gen. Dec. B-150652 (July 19,
1963) and Comp. Gen. Dec. B-153899 (Sept. 24, 1964)). The published decisions dealt
with protests by losing bidders, challenging the validity of the awards actually made. The
later decision distinguished award validity from contract administration governing the
contractor's compliance. Id. at 702.
56 42 Comp. Gen. 467, 475 (1963); 40 Comp. Gen. 644, 649 (1961) (copper did not
appear on exempt list in bid invitation, but was inadvertently added in formal contract
signed by parties; contractor entitled to assume that addition was deliberate and, entitling
him to equitable adjustment when required to use domestic copper by officer's later
change order).
57 42 Comp. Gen. at 475.
58 40 Comp. Gen. at 649.
59 48 Comp. Gen. 403, 405-06 (1968); 42 Comp. Gen. 608, 612 (1963).
60 42 Comp. Gen. at 612 (inconsistent exercise of discretionary authority by different
agency heads no basis to disturb award).
61 48 Comp. Gen. at 406 ("[N]o determination ... has been made by the Administra-
tor of [the General Services Administration] either generally or in connection with the
subject procurement. Accordingly, under the criteria established by Executive Order No.
10582 and FPR 1-6.104-4 . .. the price bid for your wrenches ... must be regarded as
unreasonable."); 42 Comp. Gen. at 612 ("No such determination was in fact made by the
Administrator of the General Services Administration, and the provisions of the Executive
Order therefore precluded acceptance of your bid because of unreasonable price.").
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post-award exceptions in 1966, in Klefstad Engineering Co.62 In up-
holding the denial of a post-award request, the Board indicated that
all arguments for latitude must be made at the time of bid or not at
all. 63
In M.S.I. Corp. ,64 decided the previous year, the same Board had
allowed a contractor's claim for equitable adjustment based on the
government agency's delay in granting an exemption.65 The reason
for granting an exception in that case was the post-award unavailabil-
ity of specified roofing materials, not the price of such materials. 66
The Board held that the contractor's obligation to locate a domestic
source did not require him to provide an acceptable domestic substi-
tute at his own expense when the specified materials were apparently
only available abroad.67 The contract provided that nondomestic
materials would be accepted under the standards of the Buy Ameri-
can Act. 68 Therefore, once aware of the unavailability, the agency
had a duty to elect within a reasonable time to order a change of
materials or to grant an exemption. 69
In 1976, in Wright & Morrissey, Inc. ,70 the Board refused to im-
pose any post-award duty to consider exceptions in a case where
availability was not an issue. The contractor made no mention in his
bid of any intention to use foreign materials on the project, but he
later submitted plans utilizing foreign goods along with a request for
a waiver.71 Relying on Klefstad, the Board held that the failure to
seek a waiver when bidding made the contractual commitment to
provide domestic materials binding. 72 The Board explicitly rejected
the notion that the contracting officer's refusal to consider foreign
62 VACAB No. 551, 66-2 B.C.A. (CCH) 1 5987, at 27,672 (1966), rev'don other grounds
on reconsideration, 67-1 B.C.A. (CCH) 6393 (1967).
63 Id. at 27,677 (argument that cost of foreign-made motors represented less than
50% of total unit cost should have been raised at time of bid).
64 VACAB No. 503, 65-2 B.C.A. (CCH) $ 5,203, at 24,447 (1965).
65 Id. at 24,459.
66 Id. at 24,449-51.
67 Id. at 24,451.
68 Id. at 24,450.
69 Id. at 24,451. The damage caused by the agency's delay was held recoverable
under the contract's suspension of work clause. Id. at 24,459. The contractor, however,
was allowed to recover under the suspension of work clause only those increased costs
directly and "necessarily caused" by the unreasonable period of delay. Id. at 24,457. Note
that the equitable adjustment was not made under the changes clause, nor was the Gov-
ernment held to have made a constructive change by failing to grant an exemption.
Rather, the Government made the change, but was dilatory.
70 VACAB No. 1147, 76-2 B.C.A. (CCH) 11,955, at 57,319 (1976).
71 Id. at 57,320. The subcontractor who was to supply the intercom system had made
his bid to the contractor without mentioning foreign equipment, but later decided to use a
foreign made system. Id. at 57,320-2 1. The contractor later submitted plans for an inter-
com system along with a request for a waiver of the contract's Buy American Act provi-
sions. Id. at 57,320. After that and a later proposal and request were rejected, the
contractor installed domestic equipment and made a claim for equitable adjustment. Id.
72 Id. at 57.321.
1990]
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goods constituted a constructive change in the contract.73
In 1977, in Edwin Moss & Son, Inc.,74 the General Services Ad-
ministration Board of Contract Appeals denied an appeal by a con-
tractor who asserted both unavailability and unreasonable CoSt. 7 5
The Board denied the appeal without reaching the question of
whether the exception would have been justified had the request
been timely. 76 It based its ruling on Executive Order 10,582, which
was referenced in the contract. 77 The Board noted that the pream-
ble to the Order predicates its procedures on the requirement that
agency heads determine "as a condition precedent to the purchase"
that domestic price is unreasonable or that purchase is in the public
interest, and it also noted the repeated references in the body of the
Order to "the bid or offered price."78 The Board found that agency
determinations clearly must precede contract awards; otherwise the
contractor's obligation is binding.79
In 1979, inJohn T. Brady & Co. ,80 the Veteran's Administration
Board once again denied an equitable adjustment for failure to re-
quest an exception at the time of the bid in accordance with the bid-
ding directions. 8' In this instance, the contractor based its bid on a
quote from a domestic aluminum supplier, but by the time the con-
73 Id. The Board noted that to find a constructive change would require a finding
that the officer had a duty to consider a deviation, and that in the exercise of such a duty he
would have been compelled to allow the deviation. Id.
74 GSBCA No. 4521, 77-1 B.C.A. (CCH) 12,517, at 60,696 (1977).
75 Prior to submitting its bid, Moss obtained a price quotation from one of the two
domestic sources of the required sheet steel. Because the Government requested exten-
sions, it did not award Moss the contract until one month had passed beyond the original
deadline. Id. at 60,697. At this later date, Moss could not obtain steel from either of the
two domestic sources in time to meet the contract deadline for the driving of sheet piling,
one of the initial contract activities. Id. at 60,697-98. Moss submitted drawings using
readily obtainable foreign steel and requested an exception from the GSA on the grounds
of a price difference in excess of six percent. The contracting officer refused, saying that
such data could not be considered subsequent to the award. Id. at 60,698.
76 Id. The Board assumed for the sake of argument that the exception requirements
would have been satisfied. Id.
77 Id.
78 Id. (citing Exec. Order No. 10,582, 3 C.F.R. 230 (1954-1958), reprinted in 41 U.S.C.
§ 10d app. at 1042 (1982)). The preamble to the Order states: "Whereas in the adminis-
tration of the act of March 3, 1933 .. . the heads of executive agencies are required to
determine, as a condition precedent to the purchase by their agencies of materials of for-
eign origin ... (a) that the price of like materials of domestic origin is unreasonable ...."
Exec. Order No. 10,582, preamble, 3 C.F.R. at 230. For text of the order referring only to
unreasonableness of the "bid or offered price," see supra note 9.
79 Moss, 77-1 B.C.A. (CCH) at 60,698 (citing Wright & Morrisey, Inc., VACAB No.
1147, 76-2 B.C.A. (CCH) 11,955 (1976); see also 50 Comp. Gen. 697 (1971)).
80 VACAB No. 1300, 79-1 B.C.A. (CCH) 13,727, at 67,300 (1979), remanded sub nom.
John T. Brady & Co. v. United States, 227 Ct. Cl. 513, 535 (1981) (per curiam order), af'd,
693 F.2d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1982).
81 Id. at 67,302. Both the Veterans Administration Board and General Services
Board considered the fact that the invitation for bids informed the bidder of the necessity
to seek exceptions when bidding. See id.; IVright & Morrisey, 76-2 B.C.A. (CCH) at 57,320;
Edwin Moss & Son, 77-1 B.C.A. (CCH) at 60,698 n.1.
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tract had been awarded and the material ordered, the price of do-
mestic aluminum had risen substantially. 82 The Board held the
contracting officer to be without authority to grant post-award waiv-
ers, there being no provision for such in the Act or in the implement-
ing regulations.a3 It also adopted the reasoning in Edwin Moss & Son,
that the Executive Order requires exceptions to be determined as
conditions precedent to the contract.8 4
Brady appealed to the United States Court of Claims.8 5 Because
Brady challenged findings of fact by the Board, and because the con-
clusions of law were issues of first impression for the court, the court
referred cross-motions for summary judgment to the trial division
for a recommendation.8 6 The trial judge concluded that an excep-
tion to the Buy American Act could have been granted by means of a
change order and remanded the case to the board for a determina-
tion of whether the exception was warranted.8 7 The Government
appealed that order.88
In 1982, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Cir-
cuit8 9 rejected the decisions of the contract appeals boards and held
that post-award exceptions to the Buy American Act are permissible.
The court in John T. Brady & Co. v. United States9" found nothing in
the Buy American Act or in the implementing executive order re-
quiring that exceptions be granted before the award, and nothing
prohibiting changes in the contract after it is executed. 91 The court
found those decisions of the Comptroller General approving post-
award exceptions to present the correct interpretation of the Act. 92
The Brady court's rationale was that adherence to the rigid rule
followed by the Veteran's Administration Board would impose unfair
burdens on contractors without furthering the objectives of the
82 79-1 B.C.A. (CCH) at 67,301.
83 Id. at 67,303.
84 Id. (quoting Edwin Moss & Son, Inc., GSBCA No. 4521, 77-1 B.C.A. (CCH)
12,517, at 60,698 (1977)).
85 John T. Brady & Co. v. United States, 227 Ct. Cl. 513, 535 (1981) (per curiam
order), aft'd, 693 F.2d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1982).
86 Id. at 536.
87 John T. Brady & Co. v. United States, 693 F.2d at 1383.
88 Id.
89 The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was created in 1982 and was given
appellate jurisdiction over the decisions of the boards of contract appeals in cases arising
under the Contract Disputes Act. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, ch. 164,
§ 127, 96 Stat. 37 (1982) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (1982)).
90 693 F.2d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1982).
91 Id. at 1385. The court noted that the preamble to the Executive Order states that
such determinations are to be made as a condition precedent to purchase of materials, not
as a condition precedent to the award. Id. Note that whereas the Veteran's Administration
Board looked for provisions allowing post-award exceptions, the court looked for provi-
sions prohibiting the same.
92 The court quoted 40 Comp. Gen. 644, 649 (1961) and 42 Comp. Gen. 468,474-75
(1963). 693 F.2d at 1385-86. See supra notes 56-58 for a discussion of these opinions.
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Act. 9 3 The court noted three situations in which unfairness would
result: (1) when it is impossible for the contractor to make the re-
quest before the award; (2) when domestic material becomes unavail-
able after the award; and (3) when the domestic price escalates
dramatically after the award. 94 Brady's situation was one of pre-
award impossibility, because the price rise occurred while the con-
tracting agency delayed in providing the specifications Brady needed
to make its order.95
On remand, the Board found the escalation in price was suffi-
ciently severe to justify granting an exception. 96 The Board calcu-
lated the cost increase to the contractor, and the equitable
adjustment due him, as the difference between what he actually paid
for the domestic aluminum and what it would have cost had the ex-
ception been granted. 97 The Boardadded that it is "certainly in the
public interest to grant legally permissible exceptions where there is
no resulting expense to the Government, and where to grant such an
exception serves to increase the public's perception of its Govern-
ment as one which deals fairly with its contractors. '98
Two years after Brady, in L. G. Lefler, Inc. v. United States,99 the
United States Claims Court read the relevant procurement regula-
tions as effectively mandating a waiver of the Buy American Act in
certain situations.100 Existing Federal Procurement Regulations di-
rected that domestic prices be deemed unreasonable if the lowest bid
contained nondomestic materials, and the price of those materials
was more than six percent less than that of domestic materials.' 0 '
Those regulations provided that an agency head could authorize
deviation from this requirement in accordance with the Act and Ex-
93 693 F.2d at 1386.
94 Id.
95 Id.
9 6 John T. Brady & Co., VACAB No. 1300, 84-1 B.C.A. (CCH) $16,925, at 84,197
(1983).
97 Id. If the exception had been granted, the cost to Brady would have been
$162,047; actual costs were $222,691, for a difference of $60,644. Id. The Board added
overhead and profit and awarded Brady $75,720. Id. Interestingly, the Board pointed out
that had the exception been granted, Brady may have owed the Government a credit, be-
cause the foreign price was $22,898 less than the original domestic quote upon which
Brady based its bid. Id. at 84,196-97. Unfortunately, the Board did not go on to explain
why it did not consider Brady's additional costs to be the difference between its bid and its
actual cost. See infra notes 133-34 for a discussion of award computations in Grimberg.
98 84-1 B.C.A. (CCH) at 84,197.
99 6 Cl. Ct. 514 (1984).
100 Id. at 518.
101 Id. (citing 41 C.F.R. § 18.603-1 (1982)). The Federal Procurements Regulations
(FPR), 41 C.F.R. ch.l, and the Defense Acquisition Regulations (DAR), 32 C.F.R. ch. 1,
were replaced effective April 1, 1984, by the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), 48
C.F.R. ch.l (1988), and various individual agency regulations. See 48 C.F.R. chs. 2-49
(1988). The FPR and the DAR continue to apply to contracts entered into before the
effective date of the FAR.
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ecutive Order 10,582.102 Veterans Administration regulations stated
that the contracting officer must request authority to consummate
the contract when he believes that the requirement is impractical or
that deviation would be advantageous to the Government.10 3 The
court ruled that these regulations require a finding by the Govern-
ment that the particular facts of a case warrant deviation before it can
deny a waiver. 10 4 Additionally, the court found that language gov-
erning pre-award waivers should also apply to post-award waivers.' 0 5
IV. Significance of the Grimberg Decision
In Grimberg, the Federal Circuit gave a broad interpretation to
the Brady and Lefler rulings and expanded the range of circumstances
in which contractors may be entitled to equitable adjustment of the
contract price. The decision had two components. First, the court
ruled that under Executive Order No. 10,582, in evaluating the rea-
sonableness of the price of domestic goods for the purposes of the
Buy American Act, the head of the procuring agency has the option
of establishing higher differentials.' 0 6 If the agency head chooses
not to exercise that option, the price differentials of section 2 of the
Order become mandatory.' 0 7 The court relied on the plain language
of the Order,' 08 the decisions of the Comptroller General, 109 and
the finding of the Claims Court in Lefter that the same standards are
applied post-award as pre-award. I 10
The Grimberg court, however, went one step beyond Lefler. As
the dissent in Grimberg points out, the holding in Lefer was concerned
with the equities of a fact situation once a post-award waiver had
been granted, not with whether a waiver should be granted. "'t Lefler
involved a winning bid based on the use of foreign materials. 112 The
102 41 C.F.R. § 1-18.603-3 (1982).
105 Lefler, 6 CI. Ct. at 519 (citing 41 C.F.R. § 8-18.603-3 (1982)).
104 Id.
105 Id. at 519 n.5.
106 John C. Grimberg, Co. v. United States, 869 F.2d 1475, 1477 (Fed. Cir. 1989). See
supra note 31 and accompanying text.
107 869 F.2d at 1477.
108 Id. "Section 2(b) provides that the price of domestic materials 'shall be deemed to
be unreasonable' if it exceeds the price of like foreign materials plus a section 2(c) differ-
ential." Id. (quoting Exec. Order No. 10,582, 3 C.F.R. 230 (1954-1958), reprinted in 41
U.S.C. § 10d app. at 1042 (1982)).
109 Id. (citing 42 Comp. Gen. at 612).
I10 Id. (citing Lefler, 6 Cl. Ct. at 519).
I1 See id. at 1481 (Bennett, J., dissenting). However, Judge Bennett further stated
that any discussion in Lefler as to when such exemptions should be granted is pure dictum.
Id. (Bennett, J., dissenting). The Lefler court believed it was answering the Government's
contention that it had been coerced into granting the waiver in order to secure timely
completion of a badly needed veteran's hospital. Lefler, 6 Cl. Ct. at 519.
112 Lefler, a contractor inexperienced in government contracts, had submitted a bid
based on the use of foreign materials. Id. at 516. Lefler did not seek an exception because
it assumed it could lawfully use foreign steel, the price of which was 24.6% below that of
the lowest domestic price. Id. Lefler was granted a post-award exception through the
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Claims Court had explicitly declined to speculate as to the effect of a
post-award waiver regarding a bid originally based on the cost of do-
mestic materials."13 The issue actually decided by the Claims Court
was whether the contracting officer was entitled to reduce the con-
tract price because of the waiver.'14 That court found that the Gov-
ernment had made the determination not to deviate from the
prescribed differential in granting the waiver, and therefore could
not claim that it had lowered Lefler's cost of performance." 5
Second, the Grimberg court defined the post-award exception as
one which is granted under the contract's changes clause "only
where warranted by the circumstances." '1 6 The court concluded
that Brady did not establish a narrow range of circumstances for post-
award exceptions, but merely held post-award exceptions to be per-
missible and allowed "additional factors" to be considered in a re-
quest for equitable adjustment.' 1 7 Given that the criteria of the Buy
American Act are met, the decision to grant a change, or an equita-
ble adjustment in lieu thereof, is discretionary." 18
By the use of the term "additional factors," the court clearly in-
tended that the grant of a post-award waiver be a matter of basic
fairness. To that extent the court followed Brady. 19 Yet, in apply-
ing the same differential to a post-award request as to a bid, the
court ignored the language in Brady recognizing dramatic domestic
increases as appropriate preconditions for post-award relief.' 20
Grimberg made no showing of a change in the domestic market for
precast concrete panels. The court's analysis of the fact situation
consisted largely of recognizing that granting a waiver would have
cost the Government nothing, and may have entitled it to a credit.
Instead, the court observed, Grimberg was "saddled" with an excess
fabrication cost. 12 1 Thus, the failure to grant the requested waiver
was held an abuse of discretion. 22
The majority left a few important questions unanswered. It gave
no guidance as to the weight to be given to the contractor's behavior.
It neglected to mention the circumstances under which a contractor
issuance of a change order because it could not cancel the order it had already placed with
the foreign supplier. Id. at 517. The contracting officer later issued a unilateral change
order reducing the contract price. Id.
113 Id. at 519.
''4 Id. at 516.
115 Id. at 519.
116 Grimberg, 869 F.2d at 1478.
1'7 Id.
11s Id.
119 See John T. Brady & Co. v. United States, 693 F.2d 1380, 1386 (1982) "To hold
otherwise, would produce unfair and harsh results without furthering the objectives of the
Act."
120 Id. at 1386. See supra text accompanying note 94.
121 Gimberg, 869 F.2d at 1478.
122 Id.
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might be held to the obligation to furnish the domestic goods upon
which the bid was based. Had the Buy American Act not been in-
volved, it is unclear whether Grimberg would have been entitled to
any adjustment of his obligation to perform at the bid price. 123 The
court did not say why Grimberg should be treated differently from
any contractor who bases his original bid on an unreliable or an
overly optimistic subcontractor's quote, only to find that the speci-
fied materials cannot be had at the quoted price.
Also absent is a discussion of the role of the policy goals behind
the Act. Early in the opinion, the court characterized the Buy Ameri-
can Act as requiring the use of domestic products unless the cost is
unreasonable or such use is inconsistent with the public interest.'24
The court then stated that the Act is primarily aimed at providing
preference in the award process.' 2 5 Later, the court quoted with ap-
proval the Veteran's Administration Board in the Brady remand to
the effect that it is in the public interest to increase "the public's
perception of its Government as one which deals fairly with its con-
tractors" when there is no resulting expense to the Government.
12 6
This seems to indicate that the court considered the Act's obvious
policy concerns to be secondary to cost considerations.
The dissent rejected the majority's approach, pointing out that
the Buy American Act would not have been enacted if the predomi-
nant policy consideration was obtaining the lowest cost to the Gov-
ernment. 127 The Buy American Act requires cost to be balanced
against the policy of favoring domestic products in order to protect
U.S. labor and industry.' 28
Accordingly, the dissent approached the question of post-award
exceptions from the standpoint of contract law. Judge Bennett saw
Brady as a decision based on fairness, allocating burdens according
to fault. 129 He read Brady to permit excuse of the contractor from
his contractual obligation only when it was impossible for the con-
123 The dissent amply demonstrates the weight of authority behind the rule that a
contractor assumes the risk of performance, including the risk of unforeseen difficulties in
obtaining materials. Id. at 1479-80 (Bennett, J., dissenting). See D. ARNAVAS & W.
RUBERRY, supra note 35, at 7-15 (contractor assumes the risk of performance and, if the
risks are obvious, cannot recover even if the work is in fact impossible); Brady v. United
States, 693 F.2d at 1386 n.3 (citing Comp. Gen. Dec. B-174266 (Feb. 22, 1972) (uncon-
scionable to require performance at contract price because price of specified domestic
material had increased "tremendously")).
124 869 F.2d at 1476-78.
125 Id. at 1477.
126 Id. at 1478 (quoting John T. Brady & Co., VACAB No. 1300, 84-1 B.C.A. (CCH)
16,925, at 84,196-97 (1983)).
127 Id. at 1481 (Bennett,J., dissenting).
128 Id. (Bennett, J., dissenting).
129 Id. at 1480 (Bennett, J., dissenting) ("Fairness is an equitable principle and its ap-
plication in Brady took the form of requiring the party causing the additional cost, the
government, to bear that cost.").
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tractor to make a pre-award request for an exemption.' 30 In Brady
and the cases upon which it relied, either the contracting agency's
actions caused the contractor not to seek a pre-award exemption or
the material was unavailable after the award.' 3 ' ForJudge Bennett,
these cases harmonized the contractor's risk of acquiring the speci-
fied materials with the government's responsibility for additional
costs caused by its own delay.' 3 2
The two different determinations of the equities in Grimberg's
situation underscore the consequences of Judge Bennett's contract
centered approach. The majority offered no formula demonstrating
the proper use of the differential. It merely compared the bid price,
the foreign supplier's quote, and the actual cost incurred by
Grimberg, along with the amount by which actual cost exceeded the
bid.' 33 Judge Bennett maintained that only the expected domestic
cost contained in the bid should be compared with the foreign cost,
on the grounds that the contractor would have been able to perform
at that cost had it done what was reasonably necessary to finalize its
subcontract. Use of the prescribed differential in that formula
yielded a trivial difference.' 34
The dissent presented one point of interest when addressing the
mandatory nature of the prescribed differentials. Judge Bennett
contended that the agency head's discretion to apply a higher differ-
ential is delegated to the contracting officer.' 3 5 He reasoned that au-
thority conferred by regulation, as opposed to that conferred by
statute, may be delegated, and the authority to apply the differentials
set by the Executive Order stems not from the Act but from the Or-
der itself.'3 6 The majority dismissed his contention in a footnote,
stating that the contract's definition of "head of agency" explicitly
excluded the contracting officer.' 3 7
130 Id. at 1479 (Bennett, J., dissenting).
131 Id. (Bennett, J., dissenting).
132 Id. at 1479-80 (Bennett, J., dissenting).
Ms Id. at 1478.
134 Id. at 1480 (Bennett, J., dissenting). The dissent calculated foreign cost as
$120,000 (foreign materials portion) X 1.06 (the 6% differential) + $117,000 (nonmate-
rial costs) = $244,200. The dissent then compared that figure with the $245,000 quote
Grimberg received before the award. Id. at 1480 n.2 (Bennett,J., dissenting). The dissent
followed Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Friedkin, 481 F. Supp. 1256, 1266-68 (M.D. Pa.), aft'd,
635 F.2d 248 (3d Cir. 1980), in applying the differential only to that part of the work which
would be performed outside the United States. 869 F.2d at 1480 n.2 (BennettJ, dissent-
ing). The majority criticized the dissent's use of this technique as being misleading, as it is
the technique used for determining the lowest bidder prior to an award. Id. at 1478 n.3.
The majority simply compared the foreign quote for fabrication ($120,000) with the actual
domestic fabrication cost ($200,000) to determine whether a waiver should have been
granted. Having found that to be the case, it then looked at the overall extra cost incurred
by Grimberg. d. at 1478.
135 Id. at 1482 (Bennett, J., dissenting).
136 Id. at 1482-83 (Bennett, J., dissenting).
137 Id. at 1478 n.l.
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The dissent's argument here is not persuasive. The Executive
Order directs that "the executive agency" determine the reasonable-
ness of domestic prices and prescribes the formula for so doing.'3 8
In addition, the Executive Order expressly confers the power to use
greater differentials on the head of the agency.' 3 9 Moreover, the
Comptroller General has described the discretionary authority con-
ferred by the Order consistently as vested in the head of the
agency. 140
Judge Bennett maintained that courts have upheld the con-
tracting officer's exercise of the agency head's discretion in other
matters. He relied on one example, the contracting officer's exercise
of the power to cancel invitations after the opening of bids when all
bids are unreasonable.' 4 1 However, the regulation in effect at the
time of the cited decisions expressly delegated that discretion to the
contracting officer. 142 The Government itself never attempted to
assert this delegation argument. Indeed, the Navy moved to dismiss
Grimberg's appeal to the Veteran's Administration Board on the
grounds that the contracting officer lacked authority to grant a
waiver. ' 43
IV. Conclusion
Grimberg does not necessarily expand the range of circumstances
in which a contractor may utilize foreign goods in the performance
of a government contract. The head of the procuring agency still has
138 Exec. Order No. 10,582, § 2, 3 C.F.R. 230, 231 (1954-1958), reprinted in 41 U.S.C.
§ 10d app. at 1042 (1982).
139 Id. § 5, 3 C.F.R. at 231.
140 See, e.g., 61 Comp. Gen. 431, 434 (1982) ("vested in the discretion of the Secre-
tary"); 48 Comp. Gen. 403,405 (1968) ("vested in the agency head"); 39 Comp. Gen. 309,
311 (1959) ("vested in the head of the department or agency concerned"). See also supra
text accompanying notes 59-61.
141 Grimberg, 869 F.2d at 1483 (quoting 48 C.F.R. § 14.404-1(c) (1988); citing National
Forge Co. v. United States, 779 F.2d 665 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Caddell Constr. Co. v. United
States, 7 Cl. Ct. 236 (1985)).
142 "Invitations may be cancelled before award but after opening when ... the con-
tracting officer determines... (6) All otherwise acceptable bids received are at unreasona-
ble prices." 48 C.F.R. § 14.404-1(c) (1985) (quoted in Caddell, 7 Cl. Ct. at 241). See also
National Forge, 779 F.2d at 667 n.2.
143 88-1 B.C.A. (CCH) at 102,891. The Navy contended that the officer's failure to
seek a determination from the Secretary of the Navy invalidated his denial of the post-
award exception, which in turn invalidated his denial of Grimberg's claim for equitable
adjustment. Id. The lack of a valid final decision by the officer would deprive the court of
jurisdiction. Id. The Board denied the Navy's motion because Grimberg's claim was effec-
tively one for equitable adjustment, under the contract's changes clause, for the failure to
grant an exception. It held the officer had unquestionable authority to act on the changes
clause claim. Id. at 102,894. It did not rule on the authority to grant an exception. The
dissent made reference to a board finding of fact that the agency validly exercised discre-
tion. Grimberg, 869 F.2d at 1438 (Bennett, J., dissenting). This is a misreading; the Board
stated, "Apparently the contracting officer had not sought a determination from the Secre-
tary of the Navy, the responsible authority, even though appellant had sent a copy of his
request through required channels." 88-1 B.C.A. (CCH) at 102,891.
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discretion in the decision to grant waivers or employ higher differen-
tials for price comparisons. 144 Grimberg does, however, restrict the
freedom of contracting officers, and put a burden on the agency
head to make determinations.
The greatest impact from Grimberg arises from the manner in
which it opens up the post-award period for the contractor. The bid
is no longer the binding document it once was. No more does the
contractor's bid make him "legally obligated under its contract to
furnish the Government a domestic source end product." 145 The
contracting officer now has an absolute duty to consider post-award
exceptions, if only to forward them upstairs for a perfunctory deter-
mination that a greater differential should be applied.
The dissent in Grimberg is correct in its fear that the underlying
policy of the Buy American Act is threatened by this loosening of the
strictures of conventional contract law. However, government con-
tracts are already unusual creatures. The standard changes clause
gives the government the unilateral right to change the performance
promised by the contractor. 146 This is an enviable right. Grimberg is
significant because it bestows an as yet undefined right to the con-
tractor at least to have a change considered. 147
If Grimberg does work against the legislative purposes of the Buy
American Act, it may not work against the interests of the country.
Deciding when to give preference to domestic goods means choos-
ing between the budget deficit and the trade deficit, between the
health of individual domestic industries and the competitiveness of
the entire economy. Executive Order No. 10,582 was originally
promulgated in response to concerns over the deleterious effects of
protectionist trade policies.i 48 Such executive action may not be
possible today, given the popular concern over the country's foreign
trade deficit. Perhaps the Federal Circuit unilaterally decided that
the benefit to taxpayers from efficiency in government procurements
outweighs the Buy American Act's protectionist goals. Unfortu-
nately, the court chose to implement its decision in a manner that
seems to weaken the government's contractual powers.
CHARLES W. CLANTON
144 41 U.S.C.A. § 10a (West Supp. 1989); Exec. Order No. 10,582, 3 C.F.R. 230
(1954-1958), reprinted in 41 U.S.C. § 10d app. at 1042 (1982); 48 C.F.R. § 25.203 (1988).
145 50 Comp. Gen. at 702.
146 See supra note 20.
147 Grimberg, 869 F.2d at 1478. If found to be an abuse of discretion, failure to grant a
requested change constitutes a constructive change as defined by the boards of contract
appeals. See also supra note 35 and accompanying text.
148 See generally Trainor, The Buy American Act: Examination, Analysis and Comparison, 64
MIL. L. REv. 101, 111-14 (1974).
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